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Similarity in linguistic categorization: 
The importance of necessary properties*
SIVA KALYAN
Abstract
Usage-based models of language propose that the acceptability of an element 
in a constructional slot is determined by its similarity to attested illers of that 
slot (Bybee 2010, ch. 4). However, Ambridge and Goldberg (2008) ind that the 
acceptability of a long-distance-dependency (LDD) question does not corre-
late with the judged similarity of the matrix verb to think and say, which are by 
far the most frequently attested illers of this slot. They propose instead that the 
acceptability of LDD questions is determined by the degree of it between the 
information-structure properties of the matrix verb and those speciied by the 
construction — speciically, the degree to which the matrix verb foregrounds its 
complement clause. This paper explores the possibility of reconciling this 
e xplanation with one based on similarity by suggesting that in this case the 
relevant aspect of similarity is precisely the verb’s foregrounding of its comple-
ment. Evidence for this suggestion comes from psychological research showing 
that in a categorization task, the similarity of an item to the exemplars of a 
category is judged primarily with respect to the features common to all cate-
gory members, as well as from the observation that virtually all attested matrix 
verbs in LDD questions strongly tend to foreground their complements.
Keywords: similarity; categorization; usage-based models; acceptability 
judgment; long-distance dependencies
*  Correspondence address: Siva Kalyan, Linguistics, School of Culture, History and Language, 
College of Asia and the Paciic, The Australian National University, Canberra ACT 0200, 
Australia. E-mail: 〈siva.kalyan@anu.edu.au〉. The author is indebted to Adele Goldberg for 
irst referring him to psychological research on similarity, and for extensive discussions and 
feedback in the early stages of writing. He would also like to thank Joan Bybee, Ronald Lan-
gacker, Ben Ambridge, and an anonymous reviewer for their valuable comments on earlier 
drafts. He has been slow to appreciate the wisdom of their advice.
(CS4)  WDG (155×230mm) TimesNewRoman   J-2601 COG, 23:3 pp. 539–554 2601_23-3_02-0004 (p. 539)
PMU: (idp) 14/05/2012 22 May 2012 3:09 PM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
540 S. Kalyan
1. Similarity and categorization
Many models of categorization presume that an item is assigned to a category 
on the basis of how similar it is to the various categories to which it could be 
assigned. This includes both prototype and exemplar models: in a prototype 
model, the likelihood of an item being assigned to a particular category d epends 
on the similarity between the item and the category’s central tendency; in an 
exemplar model, it depends on some combination (usually the sum) of the 
similarity of the item to each exemplar of the category (Medin and Schaffer 
1978; Nosofsky 1986, 1992; see also Estes 1986).
While in many cases similarity provides a clear basis for categorization, 
there are situations in which similarity and categorization appear to yield con-
trasting category assignments. To take just one example, Rips (1989: 28–32) 
inds that when people are asked to imagine a circular object three inches in 
diameter, they usually say that it is more similar to a quarter than to a pizza (on 
account of its size), and yet more likely to be a pizza ( because pizzas come in 
a range of sizes, whereas a quarter’s size is invariable). Such dissociations 
have led some researchers to conclude that similarity cannot be used to explain 
judgments of category membership.
At the same time, it has been shown (Goldstone 1994: 127–130, 135–137; 
Medin et al. 1993) that similarity judgment is a highly variable process, and, in 
particular, that the properties with respect to which the similarity between two 
items is measured depend to no small degree on the particulars of the task for 
which the comparison is being made. This raises the possibility that categori-
zation may still be capable of being explained in terms of similarity, but that 
the constraints imposed by the categorization task on the process of similarity 
judgment — in particular, the respects that are considered relevant to the 
c omparison — may differ from those that apply to “plain” similarity, and that 
this may account for the dissociations between ( plain) similarity and categori-
zation observed by Rips (1989) and others (e.g. Thibaut et al. 2002; see also 
Goldstone 1994: 131–134, 143–145; Medin et al. 1993: 275).
In this paper, I review some psychological research suggesting constraints 
on the judgment of similarity as carried out in the context of categorization. I 
will try to show how a notion of similarity thus constrained may be used to 
address some apparent problems faced by an exemplar model of linguistic pro-
ductivity. In particular, I will attempt to address the question of how to explain 
the relative acceptability of different matrix verbs in questions with long- 
distance dependencies, which has recently received some attention among 
u sage-based researchers (Ambridge and Goldberg 2008; Dąbrowska 2008, 
u nder review).
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Similarity in linguistic categorization 541
2. Similarity and acceptability judgment
In a usage-based model, the processes of comprehending an utterance and 
judging its acceptability are viewed in terms of categorization. In particular, a 
speaker’s knowledge of a language is taken to consist of a set of categories of 
symbolic structures encountered in usage; the interpretation of an utterance is 
then determined by the categories to which it and its subparts are assigned (its 
“structural description”; cf. Langacker 1987: 393, ch. 11), and its acceptability 
is determined by how much it and its subparts are sanctioned by each of these 
categories.1 In this paper, I will be looking at acceptability insofar as it depends 
on the sanction of a single category.
The categories I will be concerned with are categories of complex symbolic 
structures — in other words, constructions. A complex structure, by deinition, 
has components, and the corresponding components of the exemplars of a 
c onstruction themselves form categories known as slots (or paradigms). Any 
instance of a slot is called a iller. It should be clear that the similarity between 
one instance of a construction and another is partly determined by the s imilarity 
of corresponding components.2 To the extent that this is so, if acceptability 
depends on similarity, then the acceptability of an expression with respect to a 
construction depends on the acceptability of its components as illers of the 
construction’s slots.
Let us briely consider a concrete example, to illustrate the above assump-
tions, and to elaborate on the role of similarity in acceptability judgment. 
B ybee and Eddington (2006) present a detailed study of a set of Spanish verb-
phrase constructions consisting of a relexive verb (with an animate subject) 
meaning roughly “to become”, followed by an adjectival complement. Some 
examples are given below (using the citation forms of the verbs; Bybee and 
Eddington 2006: 330):
1. The degree to which a category sanctions an item may be compared with what Nosofsky 
(1988: 55) calls the “strength” of a particular category response in a classiication task (the 
summed similarity of the item to the exemplars of the category) — as opposed to the likelihood 
(relative strength) of that response. Note that being sanctioned by a category is different from 
being sanctioned by a schema: an item (e.g. *three muds) may be sanctioned by a schema (e.g. 
the noun-phrase schema specifying the combination of a number other than 1 with a plural 
noun), and yet fail to be adequately sanctioned by the corresponding category. It is important 
to remember that a category is a network of schemas (Langacker 1987: 377–386, 409– 411), 
and hence the sanction of a category can also be thought of as a function of the individual 
sanctions of its constituent schemas.
2. It may also depend on other properties of the expressions being compared, such as how similar 
the relation between two components of one is to the relation between the corresponding 
components of the other. See Stefanowitsch and Gries (2005: esp. 14 –18) for studies of con-
structions with relations between their slots, where this kind of relational similarity may be 
crucial for explaining their productivity.
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(1) quedarse solo ‘to end up alone’
 ponerse nervioso ‘to get nervous’
 quedarse tranquilo ‘to calm down’
 volverse loco ‘to go crazy’
For two of the verbs considered (quedarse and ponerse), Bybee and Eddington 
(2006: 351–352) ind that native speakers rate a verb phrase as acceptable to 
the extent that the adjective following the verb is similar to the adjectives that 
are known to appear with it ( particularly those that appear most often), with 
the highest ratings given most often to verb phrases with those high-frequency 
adjectival complements themselves. (The other two verbs — hacerse and 
v olverse — are not tested, since their attested complements do not exhibit much 
semantic coherence; see Bybee and Eddington 2006: 344 –347.) Thus, to 
i llustrate with quedarse, a verb phrase with sorprendida ‘surprised’ is rated by 
42 out of 48 subjects as 4 or 5 on a scale of increasing acceptability from 1 to 
5, whereas one with pasmados ‘shocked’ is thus rated by 30, and one with 
o rgullosísimo ‘extremely proud’ by only 6 (Bybee, p.c.): sorprendido occurs 
quite frequently with quedarse (four times in Bybee and Eddington’s written 
corpus and three times in the (smaller) spoken corpus), and although pasmado 
and orgullosísimo occur in this construction only once each (in the written 
and spoken corpus, respectively), the former is more similar in meaning to 
sorprendido than is the latter (as judged by one native speaker: Bybee and 
E ddington 2006: 330 –331, 334, 336 –337). (Orgullosísimo is also not very 
similar to any other adjective that occurs frequently as a complement of 
q uedarse.)
To the extent that a Spanish verb phrase headed by a verb of “becoming” has 
its acceptability judged with respect to one of the constructions under investi-
gation, Bybee and Eddington’s results can be seen to be consistent with models 
of categorization that rely on similarity to exemplars. However, there are cases 
in which similarity to the exemplars of a construction’s slot seems to be a very 
poor predictor of how acceptable an expression with a certain iller of that slot 
is with respect to the construction. One such case is introduced in the next sec-
tion, and will serve to motivate and illustrate constraints on similarity in the 
context of acceptability judgment.
3. Questions with long-distance dependencies
Ambridge and Goldberg (2008) study a restriction on the matrix verbs that can 
appear in wh-questions where the question word is “extracted” from (denotes 
an argument or adjunct in) the main verb’s inite complement clause. (These 
structures are known as long-distance dependency questions — henceforth, 
LDD questions; cf. Dąbrowska 2004: 196 –199; 2008, inter alia.) Consider 
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the following examples (Ambridge and Goldberg 2008: 360, rearranged; the 
underscore represents the “gap” in the complement clause that is “illed” by the 
wh-word):
(2) (a) Who did she say that he saw _?
 ( b) Who did she think that he saw _?
(3) (a) ??Who did she mumble that he saw _?
 ( b) ??Who did she realize that he saw _?
In general, if the matrix verb is a “light” or “bridge” verb (say, think, etc.; fur-
ther characterization to be given below), the sentence is considered more 
a cceptable than if it is either a manner-of-speaking verb (mumble, shout, etc.) 
or a factive verb (one that presupposes its complement: realize, notice, etc.).
Ambridge and Goldberg (2008) test the hypothesis that this restriction is due 
to a potential conlict between the information structure properties of the main 
verb and those of the construction. They propose (following Goldberg 2006: 
315, who calls this the “Backgrounded constructions are islands”, or BCI, 
h ypothesis) that in any iller-gap construction, the constituent that serves as the 
gap cannot be backgrounded: it must either be the topic of the corresponding 
non-gapped clause, or it must be in its potential focus domain (i.e. part of what 
is asserted, rather than what is presupposed or otherwise non-asserted). Since a 
complement clause is usually not a topic, this means that in order for a gap to 
occur in the complement clause, that clause must be in the potential focus 
d omain.
In sentences in which the main verb is a manner-of-speaking or factive verb, 
the complement clause is usually backgrounded. To see this, consider the fol-
lowing sentence pairs (Ambridge and Goldberg 2008: 364 –365, rearranged):
(4) (a) She shouted that he left.
 ( b) She didn’t shout that he left.
(5) (a) She realized that he saw the roses.
 ( b) She didn’t realize that he saw the roses.
In (4), neither sentence indicates whether he left; they only make a claim about 
the manner in which this content was conveyed. In (5), both sentences presup-
pose that he saw the roses; they differ only in terms of what they say about 
whether she was aware of this fact. Hence, in both (4) and (5), the complement 
clause is not part of what is asserted, and thus, being neither the topic nor part 
of the focus domain, it is backgrounded. Thus we can see that, according to the 
BCI hypothesis, manner-of-speaking and factive verbs cannot easily be used as 
main verbs in LDD questions (yielding the double-question marks in (3)).
On the other hand, “light” or “bridge” verbs (think, say, believe, and a few 
others) are deined partly by the fact that their complement clause need not be 
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backgrounded (i.e. may be asserted or foregrounded). To see this, consider the 
following sentence pairs (cf. Ambridge and Goldberg 2008: 368–369):
(6) (a) She said that he left.
 ( b) She didn’t say that he left.
(7) (a) She thought that he saw the roses.
 ( b) She didn’t think that he saw the roses.
To some extent, (6b) can be taken as implying that he didn’t leave, and (7b) as 
implying that he didn’t see the roses. (This also depends on, among other 
things, how strongly the speaker identiies with the main-clause subject; cf. the 
discussion of “argumentative strength” in Verhagen 2005: 105–107.) Since 
n egating an (a) sentence may result in negating the content of the complement 
clause, the complement clause may be part of what is asserted by these sen-
tences, and thus may be foregrounded. Accordingly, BCI predicts that it is 
possible to use a bridge verb as a main verb in an LDD question; hence, the 
absence of question marks in (2).
Ambridge and Goldberg (2008) contrast their account of LDD questions 
with one suggested by the work of Dąbrowska (2004: 197–198, 217–219; 
2008: 392–393), who inds that in natural speech, almost all LDD questions are 
instances or minimal variations of two high-frequency schemas: WH do you 
think S-GAP? and WH did you say S-GAP?.3 (See also Verhagen 2005: 121–
126 for similar patterns in written Dutch.) She proposes that these two schemas 
constitute prototypes of the category of LDD questions, and that instances of 
the category that are not subsumed by these prototypes are produced and inter-
preted by analogy with them: by making substitutions for the ixed elements 
(do/did, you, think/say) and by inserting elements at certain positions (e.g. the 
complementizer that after the main verb). She provides experimental evidence 
(Dąbrowska 2008: 412– 414) that subjects rate sentences that deviate from the 
prototypes as consistently worse than those that conform to them (with the 
exception that changing the main-clause subject to a proper noun has no sig-
3. Notice that, unlike the sentences used by Ambridge and Goldberg (2008), the schemas that 
Dąbrowska describes have no complementizer, and the auxiliary is in the present tense when 
the matrix verb is think (cf. also Dąbrowska under review). Of course, this does not bear 
d irectly on the question of which matrix verbs are most acceptable.
  A construct such as S-GAP (representing a inite clause with a gap in it, i.e. lacking an argu-
ment or adjunct) may seem to violate the content requirement (Langacker 1987: 53–54), since 
it is deined in terms of something that is absent, i.e. that does not “actually occur in [a] lin-
guistic expression”. See Kalyan (in preparation a) for discussion of such apparent violations 
(and why they may be only apparent), as well as the suggestions on how to analyze “wh-
movement” in relative clauses in Langacker (1991: 465– 466) and Langacker (2008: 423– 426).
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niicant effect on acceptability). In particular, she inds that when the main verb 
is something other than think or say, the rated acceptability drops signiicantly. 
While Dąbrowska does not test different degrees of deviation from the main 
verbs of the prototypes, her claim that these schemas form the basis for ana-
logical extension suggests that the more similar the main verb is to think or say, 
the more prototypical the sentence will seem, and the more acceptable it will 
be judged. (This would be consistent with the assumptions and indings noted 
in the previous section, which would suggest that the acceptability of an LDD 
question partly depends on the similarity of the matrix verb to the most fre-
quently attested illers of that slot.)
Ambridge and Goldberg (2008: 363) do not exclude the possibility that the 
two schemas proposed by Dąbrowska are stored in the speaker’s mind 
(a lthough they do not ind any positive evidence for it; but see Dąbrowska 
under review). However, their experimental results seem to contradict the 
h ypothesis that the acceptability of an LDD question depends on how similar 
the main verb is to think or say, thereby casting doubt on the idea that these two 
schemas form the basis for analogical extension. For each of a set of bridge, 
manner-of-speaking and factive verbs, they measure (a) how much less accept-
able it is rated in an LDD question than in a corresponding declarative (its 
“dispreference for extraction” or “difference score”); ( b) how strongly its 
n egation is judged to imply the negation of its complement (its “negation test 
score”, a measure of how much it foregrounds its complement clause); and (c) 
how similar it is judged to be to think and to say in the context of a polar ques-
tion (as well as independently of context, using Latent Semantic Analysis). 
They ind a striking (negative) correlation between the difference scores and 
the negation test scores, but no signiicant correlation between a verb’s differ-
ence score and its similarity to think or say. Thus, their results support the 
i nformation-structure account, but appear to be problematic for an account of 
acceptability that depends on similarity to exemplars.
It is possible, however, to accept Ambridge and Goldberg’s (2008) indings 
without rejecting a similarity-based account. What is needed is the idea that the 
acceptability of an LDD question depends on how similar the matrix verb is to 
attested LDD question matrix verbs (chiely think and say), in terms of fore-
grounding its complement clause — in which case the more the matrix verb 
foregrounds its complement, the more acceptable the sentence is, in accor-
dance with the BCI hypothesis.
But how does a speaker know that in this case, similarity should be judged 
with respect to foregrounding of the complement, as opposed to some other 
property of the verb? More generally: In what respects must a component of an 
expression be similar to the attested illers of a construction’s slot in order for 
it to be able to ill that slot? This is a problem for any exemplar model of 
p roductivity. Goldberg (1995: 133–134) writes the following in relation to the 
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proposal that the range of verbs that can appear in the English ditransitive con-
struction is circumscribed by a set of “narrowly deined verb classes”:
Narrowly deined verb classes, then, are implicitly represented as clusters of semanti-
cally related verbs known to occur with a given construction. New or previously unclas-
siied verb forms are attracted to existing clusters on the basis of similarity to existing 
cases. However, judgments of similarity are notoriously variable across speakers and 
contexts, and two activities can almost always be said to be similar in some respect. 
Therefore, in order to adequately defend the idea that the use of new and novel senses 
is determined by similarity to existing cases, one must be able to deine the similarity 
metric which is to be used as the basis of comparison.
(For comments of a similar [!] nature, see Bybee 2010: 62.) The problem of 
variable similarity is hardly unknown in cognitive psychology. Indeed, it is the 
lip side of the arguments against similarity-based categorization referred to in 
Section 1: whereas Rips (1989) and other dissociation studies take similarity as 
a ixed construct, and show that it differs systematically from categorization, 
others have argued that similarity is too unconstrained a notion to be of any use 
in explaining other processes (cf. Goldstone 1994: 135; Medin et al. 1993: 
254 –257). It has already been suggested in Section 1 that while similarity is 
lexible, it is not totally unconstrained, and that constraints on similarity judg-
ment can be found in the nature and purpose of the task being performed. In the 
following section, I survey some of the psychological literature that bears on 
such constraints, particularly in the context of a categorization task.
4. Constraints on similarity
The way in which we measure similarity obviously depends on the kind of 
representation we assume for the items being compared. There are two com-
mon ways of representing items: as points in a multidimensional space, and as 
(structured or unstructured) collections of features (Thibaut 1997: 705–718). 
Here I consider a featural representation.4
4. I use the word “feature” for consistency with the papers being cited. However, I do not mean 
to commit myself to the existence of a ixed set of features into which all items can be exhaus-
tively decomposed. See Schyns, Goldstone and Thibaut (1998) and Langacker (1987: 19–22) 
for more lexible approaches to features (see also Thibaut (1997: 704, my translation): “fea-
tures are aspects of real entities, often posited on the basis of the researchers’ or subjects’ 
i ntuition, i.e. without any theoretical constraints”). (Cruse [1986: 22] uses the term “trait” as 
an alternative without the connotations of universality and exhaustiveness. I thank Adele 
Goldberg for cautioning me on this terminological issue.)
  The issue of the relative appropriateness of dimensional and featural representations is an 
intricate one. Thibaut (1997: 704) suggests that “[f  ]ormally, dimensions can be represented in 
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In most feature-based models of similarity, starting with Tversky’s (1977) 
seminal paper, similarity between two items increases with the number and 
salience of shared features, and decreases with the number and salience of non-
shared features. (For further details, see Tversky 1977; for important reine-
ments to his model, see Gati and Tversky 1984; Ortony 1979; Ortony et al. 
1985.) There are many factors affecting the salience of a feature; let us look at 
one that is particularly relevant for categorization.
Medin et al. (1993) cite an unpublished experiment where Doberman pin-
schers are rated as more similar to raccoons than to sharks, and yet more likely 
to belong to the set {boar, lion, shark} than to the set {boar, lion, raccoon}. 
They explain this by saying that “ ‘[f  ]erocious’ becomes important [in the irst 
category] because it emerges as a similarity between all three category mem-
bers” (Medin et al. 1993: 275).
A more systematic demonstration is provided by Thibaut et al. (2002). They 
construct two categories of drawings of jellyish-like creatures that vary by the 
shape of the body and the arrangement of its four legs. Each category has one 
feature that is salient and present in most members (its “characteristic feature”, 
in this case round vs. T-shaped body; this is known to be salient because most 
participants sorted the stimuli by this feature in a free-sorting task), as well as 
one feature that is present in all members, but is not very salient (its “necessary 
feature”, in this case legs grouped as 1 and 3 vs. 2 and 2; only two out of 22 
participants sorted by this feature). They ind that a novel item with the charac-
teristic feature of one category and the necessary feature of the other (e.g. a 
jellyish with a round body and legs arranged in two groups of two) is nearly 
always classiied according to the necessary feature (the arrangement of legs), 
despite this being less salient.
Finally, Nosofsky (1986), using dimensional (as opposed to featural) repre-
sentations of stimuli, inds that if subjects learn categories that differ along one 
dimension (e.g. the size of dial-like igures as opposed to their needle angle), 
their subsequent performance in classifying novel stimuli is best accounted for 
by a representation in which the crucial dimension (in this case, size) is 
“stretched” with respect to the representation revealed by other tasks. In other 
words, when the categories that are learned are deined by necessary values (or 
ranges of values) on a dimension, that dimension (and hence the values on it) 
becomes highly salient in a categorization task.
terms of features” (cf. Gati and Tversky 1982), while the converse is not true. However, 
Glazer and Nakamoto (1991: 214 –215) prove mathematically that there are many kinds of 
dimensional structures that cannot be expressed in terms of features. The choice between the 
two kinds of representation must ultimately be determined on empirical grounds (and it need 
not be an exclusive choice; see Nosofsky and Zaki 2003 for a successful hybrid model).
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Thus, an important constraint on similarity in categorization seems to be that 
necessary features of the category — features exhibited by all members —  
assume high salience, and hence have a large effect on the similarity between 
each exemplar of the category and the item to be categorized.5 We can now 
explain the result obtained by Rips (1989), mentioned in the irst section, 
where a circular object 3 inches in diameter is judged more similar to a quarter 
but more likely to be a pizza. The diameter of a quarter, being ixed, is a neces-
sary feature of the category of quarters, and hence becomes highly salient 
when the target item is being judged against it. Since the diameter of a quarter 
is not shared by an object 3 inches in diameter, this amounts to a very salient 
non-shared feature, which results in very low similarity, and hence a very low 
likelihood of category membership. Pizzas, by contrast, being widely variable 
in size, cannot easily be said to have a size feature that is necessary (or at least, 
not one that is not shared by a 3-inch object).
5. Back to LDD questions
As mentioned in Section 3, Dąbrowska’s (2008) indings suggest that a verb 
is judged acceptable in an LDD question to the extent that it is similar to 
think and say. According to the present proposal, this view can be reconciled 
with Ambridge and Goldberg’s (2008) seemingly contradictory experimental 
results, provided we assume that in this context, the similarity between the 
target verb and think and say is judged with respect to the verb’s foregrounding 
of its clausal complement. The question, then, is how a speaker knows that this 
is the relevant respect.
Given that the vast majority of LDD questions have think or say as the main 
verb (96% in the Manchester corpus [Dąbrowska 2004: 197], and 86% in the 
British National Corpus [Dąbrowska under review]), and given that both of 
these verbs strongly tend to foreground their complement (Ambridge and 
Goldberg 2008, Figure 3; Dąbrowska under review, Figures 4, 7–9), we can see 
that the property of foregrounding the complement comes quite close to being 
5. It is by no means the case that non-necessary features of the category cease to have any inlu-
ence whatsoever (  pace Thibaut et al. 2002). For instance, Thibaut and Gelaes (2006) ind that 
even when the necessary features of a category are perfectly clear, people may mistakenly 
classify an item missing necessary features into that category if it exhibits suficient similarity 
to one exemplar.
  Also, with respect to the Medin et al. (1993) experiment, one might wonder why “mam-
mal”, being a shared property of {boar, lion, raccoon}, should not enjoy the high salience that 
“ferocious” has in the other category — especially since the fact that Doberman pinschers are 
ordinarily judged more similar to raccoons than to sharks seems to suggest that “mammal” is 
more salient than “ferocious”! Clearly, there is more to the salience of “ferocious” here than 
simply its being a necessary feature (though this is certainly a contributing factor).
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a necessary feature of LDD main verbs. Thus, from the results in the previous 
section, it seems likely that when the speaker judges the extent to which a sen-
tence is sanctioned by the LDD question construction, this property of the verb 
will have a strong (if not determining) effect on the similarities thus computed. 
In other words, the greater the extent to which the verb foregrounds its comple-
ment, the more likely it is to possess the property of being a complement-
foregrounding verb; the more likely this property is to be counted as a shared 
feature; and the greater the similarity of the verb to attested LDD main verbs.
I do not wish to imply that foregrounding of the complement is the only 
property of LDD main verbs that behaves as a necessary feature. Another prop-
erty common to think and say is that both indicate that the subject asserts the 
content of the complement clause: e.g. Mary said it was going to rain indicates 
not only that Mary conveyed a certain message through speech, but also that 
she asserted this belief, and is thus committed to the consequences of holding 
it. (I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.) Yet another 
is that these verbs minimize the distinction between the subject’s attitude to-
wards the content of the complement, and that of the speaker (or addressee, in 
the case of a question; cf. Verhagen 2005: 127–131; Dąbrowska 2008: 415). 
The argument I am making is consistent with all of these properties being 
r elevant; I am focusing on complement-foregrounding simply in order to show 
that the present proposal is capable of explaining the indings of Ambridge and 
Goldberg (2008). I would like to point out, though, that such properties as 
these, which pertain more to the speech situation than to the object of concep-
tualization, are unlikely to be the ones that are most salient when explicitly 
judging the similarity of a verb to think and say.
The explanation proposed in this paper is thus very similar to that of 
A mbridge and Goldberg (2008), in that the acceptability of an LDD question 
is a matter of the degree of it between the verb’s speciications and those of the 
construction. However, it differs in terms of the nature of the potential mis-
match: in the model assumed by Ambridge and Goldberg (2008: 366; see also 
Goldberg 2006: 135), the reason why a main verb in an LDD question cannot 
background its complement is that if it did, the wh-word would be at once 
foregrounded ( by the construction, which places it at the front of the sentence) 
and backgrounded ( by the verb, which backgrounds the clause to which the 
wh-word belongs), resulting in a “pragmatic clash” (Goldberg 2006: 132).6 
The present proposal states merely that a complement-backgrounding verb 
6. Doubts have been expressed concerning the validity of the notion “pragmatic clash” (e.g. 
Croft 2009: 160 –161: “. . . it is not clear to me why the pragmatic clash is allowed in the [wh- 
in situ] languages that allow [questioning of backgrounded elements]. Do these languages 
have the ability to express an information structure coniguration that English (and similar 
languages) cannot?”). See Kalyan (in preparation b) for further discussion of this issue.
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would be a poorly-sanctioned iller of the main verb slot of the LDD question 
construction (see also Ambridge in press).
There are a few questions that are left unanswered by the present account. 
First, the two prototypical LDD schemas, WH do you think S-GAP? and WH 
did you say S-GAP?, share many properties apart from those of their main 
verbs. In particular, they both specify you as the subject. Yet Dąbrowska (2008: 
409– 410) inds no signiicant effect on acceptability of changing the subject 
from a second-person pronoun to a lexical noun phrase, despite the fact that the 
property of having a second-person subject is shared among attested LDD 
questions almost as widely as the main verbs think and say (91% in the Man-
chester corpus [Dąbrowska 2004: 197], 90% in the spoken BNC [Dąbrowska 
2011]). Dąbrowska (2008: 398–399) suggests that this is because nominals are 
conceptually autonomous, and hence can be easily substituted for each other. 
This can also be thought of in terms of the relative salience of properties of the 
subject and properties of the verb. Croft and Cruse (2004: 318–320, 323–324) 
provide evidence that the properties of arguments in a sentence are less salient 
than properties of the predicate (see also Healy and Miller 1970), and explain 
this in terms of a relevance hierarchy for sentential meaning (similar to the 
relevance hierarchy for verbal meaning in Bybee 1985: 24). If the property of 
having a second-person subject is relatively non-salient, an LDD question 
with a different subject would not be judged substantially dissimilar to attested 
instances on account of that, and hence its acceptability would not suffer much.
Secondly, there should be some way of explaining why, in certain contexts, 
an LDD question with a complement-backgrounding verb is acceptable. For 
example, Ambridge and Goldberg (2008: 365) note that a question such as 
What did you whisper that the house was? is acceptable in a context where the 
manner of speaking coded by the main verb is presupposed (e.g. in a game of 
whisper-down-the-alley). One possibility is that in such contexts, the main 
verb takes on a special, complement-foregrounding sense. Alternatively, we 
could say that the verb retains its ordinary meaning, but that because the 
m anner of speaking (foregrounded by the verb) is already established in the 
discourse, the difference between this verb and one that does not foreground 
manner (such as think or say) loses salience. The matter remains indeterminate 
until we have a way of determining the meaning of a word in a given context 
(see Kalyan in preparation b).
Finally, I would like to mention Dąbrowska’s (under review) inding that not 
all speakers are sensitive to the BCI constraint, i.e. that for some speakers, an 
LDD question whose main verb is something other than think or say is just as 
(un)acceptable regardless of how strongly the verb foregrounds its comple-
ment. While I have no evidence to offer, this result is what one would expect, 
for example, if some speakers encountered think and say in LDD questions 
with such extreme frequency that even the properties of these verbs that are not 
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necessary features of LDD main verbs became highly salient. In this case, even 
if a verb (other than think or say) had a strong tendency to foreground its 
complement, this would not signiicantly improve its similarity to attested 
LDD main verbs, since some of the non-shared features would be highly 
s alient.
A recurring issue here is that of how to determine the salience of a feature. 
It does not seem to be enough to say that necessary features of a category tend 
to be more salient than non-necessary features; as seen above, there are many 
other factors affecting salience, which may reduce the salience of a necessary 
feature or boost the salience of a non-necessary one. Moreover, even to the 
extent that the hypothesis concerning necessary features of a category is valid 
on its own, it only raises another question: How do we know which categories 
are relevant in judging the acceptability of a usage event? So far it has been 
implicitly assumed that the acceptability of an LDD question is determined 
largely by the extent to which it is sanctioned by the category of LDD ques-
tions. It could well be the case, however, that the acceptability is determined 
by a more general WH AUX THING VPbare-GAP? construction where nearly all attested illers of the VP slot are such that the constituent containing the gap 
is foregrounded in a corresponding declarative — or even by an argument-
structure frame for the main verb, with respect to which the (a)typicality of 
foregrounding the complement may be judged — or, most likely, by some com-
bination of the above. To answer this question, we would need to be able to 
determine the relative saliences of the schemas involved. Hopefully the above 
comments give an idea of the true scope of the problem: A clearly articulated 
theory of similarity is attendant on a clearly articulated theory of salience.
6. Conclusions
In this paper I have tried to show how an exemplar view of linguistic categori-
zation may be qualiied in such a way as to address what might otherwise be a 
fundamental weakness. Exemplar models propose that people classify an item 
on the basis of how similar it is to the exemplars of the available categories 
( Nosofsky 1986; 1992). However, when applied to language, and particularly 
when the exemplars are represented in terms of semantic properties, the exact 
basis for the measurements of similarity is often left unspeciied. In addition, 
researchers have tended to treat similarity as a largely invariant construct, pre-
dicting a construction’s productivity using judgments of similarity obtained in 
other tasks (as in, e.g. Bybee and Eddington 2006). While this is often a useful 
assumption (as in that study), work such as that of Ambridge and Goldberg 
(2008) suggests that it does not always hold. It must be recognized that 
c onstraints on similarity judgment have to be determined separately for each 
context.
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In reviewing the relevant literature in cognitive psychology, I have tried to 
provide one such constraint in the context of categorization tasks. In particular, 
I have cited evidence that the aspects that one considers most relevant when 
evaluating similarity to the exemplars of a category tend to be those features 
that characterize the category itself. By way of illustration, I have tried to rein-
terpret the indings of Ambridge and Goldberg (2008) and show that the rela-
tive acceptability of main verbs in questions with long-distance dependencies 
can indeed be explained as being determined by similarity to verbs that have 
been attested in the construction. This is possible because nearly all attested 
LDD questions have main verbs that strongly tend to foreground their clausal 
complements, and hence similarity in this context may be understood to be 
judged with respect to the verbs’ tendency to foreground their complements.
Let me conclude by quoting further from Goldberg’s analysis of the produc-
tivity of the English ditransitive construction (Goldberg 1995: 134):
On the present account, the characterizations of the verb classes themselves can be 
viewed as providing a similarity metric. For example, if one of the verb classes associ-
ated with the ditransitive is “verbs of ballistic motion,” then we can consider shin to be 
relevantly like kick in that it is a verb of ballistic motion.
The main intended contribution of this paper has been to add psychological 
lesh to the bones of this idea.
Received 4 February 2010 Australian National University
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